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MEANINGFUL REFORM OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS:'WILL A TRUST 
PARADIGM PROVIDE THE BALANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND 
RESOURCE PRODUCTION NEEDED FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
Chairman: Raymond Cross
The current problems with the Forest Service are well 
documented. Due to its roots in the Progressive Era, the 
Forest Service has not evolved into an agency capable of 
balancing the competing needs of public forest users. 
Instead, overcentralization and budget structure have 
resulted’ in a top-down management approach that loses money 
and perpetuates losses of biodiversity. These problems with 
the Forest Service have evolved for almost a century and are 
too ingrained to be addressed by any piecemeal reform. 
Instead, a large scale reform of the entire structure needs 
to initiated and a new paradigm fpr public forest management 
instituted.
Based on policies in the school trust lands context, a 
trust paradigm would have many advantages for national 
forest management. Trusts provide clear mandates for. the 
trustee, instead of confusing multiple use mandates. Most 
of the current economic disincentives would be eliminated 
under a trust paradigm. The competing duties of making the 
trust productive and preserving the corpus of the trust 
force trustees to balance short term economic needs with 
long term preservation.
The "National Forest Trust Act", as proposed-and modified 
in this paper, can provide a worthwhile departure into 
examining how a national forest trust would be created.
Trust language mandates that lands be managed in accordance 
with accepted trust principles while implementing ecosystem 
management. This management structre would provide a clean 
break with ingrained multiple use, sustained yield practices 
and usher in a new era of national forest management.
ii
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Like a predictable lunar cycle,, the debate over how to 
manage our public lands has once again entered the 
mainstream. Thanks to commentators such as Jon Souder and 
Sally Fairfax, a new management paradigm has also been 
thrown into the debate: the trust. As a model of trust 
management, the state school trust lands are being examined 
as an alternative to large federal. agency management. This 
is particularly surprising 'given the unfavorable reputation 
that the state has so far developed in the public lands 
context.1'
Shifts in traditional interest group alliances may 
provide some answers as to why the conventional wisdom of 
states as land managers seems to be changing. For most of 
this century, debates over how to manage public land was 
dominated by two 'factions: multiple use conservationists vs. 
wilderness preservationists.2 However, as we enter into
,1 Sally K. Fairfax', Thinking the Unthinkable: States 
as Public Land Managers, 3 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl L. & 
Pol'y 249, 254-256 (1996). Professor Fairfax identifies 
cycles of state primacy that occurred within the context of 
federal land management. Now that we are in the era of land 
retention, state managers are vilified-by environmentalists 
as being anti-retention and dishonestly- admired by sagebrush 
rebels, despite the fact that they have the, most to lose 
from transferring federal land to the states. Id. at 255- 
256.
2 This conflict, is basically an extension of the 
Gifford Pinchot vs. John Muir disputes of the early 20th 
century.
the twentieth century, the solidarity of either side is 
beginning to break down as individual interest groups are 
seeing new allies.3 One commentator identifies five 
factors as an explanation for the sudden focus on state land 
management as a model for federal land management: the rise 
of grassroots environmentalism, the introduction of natural 
resource economics, landscape level thinking, the end of 
Progressive Era science and the observation that the land
management problems of the west are also being experienced
/ '
in the east.4 While the implications of these shifting 
alliances is beyond the scope of this paper, expanding, the 
tools of the debate to include trusts will play a positive 
role in examining reform of the current system.
The current literature examining state land management 
focuses on school trust lands as a comparative model for. 
possible federal land management.5 These commentators have
3 Of particular interest is the strained
similarities between deep ecologists and libertarian 
economists. Robert Nelson, Government as Theater: Towards a 
New Paradigm for the Public hands, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 33 5, 
355-356 (1994). Another, example is the local management 
alternative for reintroduction of grizzly bears- to the 
Bitterroot ecosystem that is co-sponsored by the Inter- 
Mountain Forestry Products AssocNational Wildlife 
Federation, and Defenders of Wildlife,. Bear With It:
Grizzly Re introduction Plan Worth A Try, Columbus Dispatch, 
January 17, 1997, at 8A.
.• 4 Fairfax, supra note 1, at 256-257.
5 See generally Sally K. Fairfax, Jon A. Souder &
Greta Goldenman, The School Trust Lands: a Fresh Look at 
Conventional Wisdom, 22 Envtl. L..797 (1992); Fairfax, supra 
note 1.
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come to the conclusion that', while state trust management 
could be a possible departure for reform, trust management 
is not a: panacea for all the political inefficiencies of 
public land management.6 It is doubtful that any of these 
commentators would suggest a wholesale shift of land 
ownership from federal to state governments. Indeed, the 
political realities would make such an idea virtually 
impossible.7
This paper takes the next step in the debate and 
examines how trust management of public lands would, possibly 
be organized and what benefits of such a management scenario 
would achieve. Because the vast majority-of western public 
land is held by the Forest Service, this paper >will examine 
trust management in relation to that agency.® This will
' r
serve as both a narrowing feature and a commonality for 
states in the northwest.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first
6 Fairfax, supra note 1, at 262-263.
7 Two noted commentators,' Jack Ward Thomas and 
Charles Wilkinson, capture popular opinion when they flatly 
deny a large scale devolution of public ownership as a 
viable solution. Charles Wilkinson, The Public Lands and 
the Public Heritage, Different Drummer,' Fall 1995, at 9;
Jack Ward Thomas, The View From the Top: Some Comments from 
the Chief, 17 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 9, 21-22 (1996).
8 While some of the problems inherent in the Forest 
Service can not be translated to other land management 
agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, it is 
probable that many of the benefits of, forest trust 
management could be imputed to those lands as well. . Indeed, 
if successful ecosystem management is to be achieved, agency 
boundaries need to be dissolved.
section will examine current failures of the Forest Service. 
The first step for change is identifying the harm caused by 
the status, quo. In this section, I argue that the problems 
found within the Forest Service are both 'imbedded and 
intertwined. Therefore, only a large scale paradigmatic 
shift will bring about fruitful reform.
In the second section, I examine state school trust 
lands. I briefly analyze the competing trust duties of 
state trust managers and how the courts have interpreted 
these duties. Trust land management is slowly evolving to 
account for preservation goals as well as current income 
production. While few environmentalists regard state trust 
lands as a model of ecological health, the organizational 
structure of that trust could provide tangible benefits for 
future land management.
In the third section, I examine a, trust bill proposed 
by' the Thqreau Institute, and provide a model trust 
agreement. My intent is to identify some of the issues that 
must be resolved if a trust management scheme were to be 
offered as a paradigm for public land management.
II. Failures in. U.S. Forest Service Management
Agency bashing is a time honored pastime in the 
American west. Because of its primacy in land stewardship 
in the northwest, the Forest Service is then perhaps the 
most reviled agency. Some commentators argue that, despite
5
its shortcomings, the Forest Service is actually a very 
capable manager.9
/
However mediocrity is not a valued trait in American 
society. The effectiveness of the Forest Service must be 
debated so that new and better methods of land management 
may be investigated.• This is especially true now that the 
Service is seeking to implement cutting-edge science, such 
as ecosystem management, and account for past policies that 
have consistently lost money for the treasury..
There are three cote failures of modern forest 
management: Progressive Era science, overcentralization,
and economically inefficient policies. These failures are 
interwoven and closely related to one another. One 
shortcoming can not be individually corrected without 
addressing them all. Because of their interconnectedness, 
piecemeal reform of the Forest Service is impracticable. A 
fundamental shift in the management paradigm must be 
pursued.
A. The Inability of Progressive Era Science to Adjust to
Realities of the Modern World
The Forest Service was created during the Progressive 
Era, in American society.10 Forest Management during the 
Progressive Era was characterized by an unwavering faith in 
science to provide answers to the complex and growing
9 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 10.
10 . Robert H. Nelson, The Failure of Scientific 
Management, Different Drummer, Fall 1995 at 13.
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demands of American society.11 Scientific resource 
management would ensure a constant supply of commodities, 
thereby providing the greatest good for the greatest number 
of Americans.
However, grounding modern forest management in ideas 
that are over 100 years old presents several difficulties 
for reforming today's Forest Service. First, these ideas 
are so ingrained that any large scale changes are unlikely 
without a sweeping paradigmatic shift. Second, the 
unqualified, belief in science to provide answers ignores the 
realities of a democratic society. . Third, the mechanisms 
necessary to implement Progressive Era science, primarily 
command and control regulation, have proven to be highly 
inefficient methods of public land management.
Gifford Pinchot and his successors effectively 
insulated the'Forest Service from the forces that 
transformed other government agencies.12 This enabled the 
progressive paradigm to take root and it drive Forest 
Service decisions today. Most foresters in the Service are
. 11 Nelson, supra note 3, at 344. The historical 
context of the Progressive Era was set against a backdrop of 
increasing industrialization, scientific discovery and the 
turning from divine guidance to secular pursuits. Id.
12 This insulation created what some called an 
"esprit de corps" or religious zeal" among Forest Service 
employees in fulfilling their mission. Nelson supra*note 
10, at 13. It was not until early 1970 when events such as 
the Bolle report and the Mononoahela decision did the Forest 
Service come under widespread public scrutiny for its 
management practices. Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the 
Next Meridian 140-144 (1992).
career employees that accept the beliefs and culture of 
their profession.13
The culture of scientific management tends to evolve an 
agency that is inflexible and unaccepting of change.14 
Forest Service management has evolved into a near theology.: 
the "religion of public land management."16 instead of 
adapting to new information and challenges, the Forest 
Service has stagnated under a distrust of outsiders from 
other agencies or the private sector.16 The current 
attitude of the Service can best be described as embattled, 
creating a more introverted agency in an era where 
extroversion is necessary, for wise and integrated 
management.
Gifford Pinchot was a firm believer that politics and 
scientific management did not mix.17 Ultimately, 
scientific management necessitates the end of political 
input into policy decisions.18 If resources are to be 
managed scientifically by elite managers; the Forest Service 
cannot afford to have public opinion second guessing its
13 ' Marion Clawson, The Economics of National Forest 
Management 102 (1976) .
14 id*, at 103.-
15 Nelson, supra note 3, at 353.-
16 Id. at 354; Clawson, supra note 13, at 103.
17 Nelson, supra note 10, at 13.
18 Nelson, supra note 3, at 345.
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decisions. However, this belief ignores a basic tenet of 
our democratic society: competing values and interests.19
After World War II, the number and power of interest 
groups rose and demanded a.voice in the decision process. 
With the Mononcrahela decision that declared clearcutting 
illegal, interest groups successfully questioned the Forest 
Service's science, forever eliminating the perceived 
infallibility of Service discretion.20 Furthermore, the 
legislation passed during the late I960's and into the 
1970's, primarily the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)21 and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)22, 
gave interest groups a stronger voice in determining the 
,outcome of timber management.
While other agencies have come to grips with the now 
politically charged atmosphere of land management, the 
Forest Service.has not changed the progressive paradigm.23 
Instead it has cobbled together a mixed bag of progressive 
science and democratic participation that is mostly
19 See James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulations, and 
Environmental Protection, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 425, 428 (1994) 
(arguing1 that public decisions are, by definition, political 
decisions and scientists do not have a special capacity to 
chose among competing values).
20 Nelson, supra note 10, at 13.
21 43 U.S.C.A. §4321 et seq.
22 16 U.S.C.A. §1600 et seq.
23 Nelson, supra note 3, at 347-48.
9
procedural and unacceptable to most constituents.24
The core standard of interest group government is 
simply that a satisfactory political compromise 
can be worked out among all the players. At least 
in the extreme forms of this political philosophy,
. the substantive result is not really, of concern at 
all. Other than the fact that an agreement is 
reached, there is no further objective basis for 
judging the final outcome because in interest- •. 
group liberalism, all the attention is focused on 
the procedure followed.25
An agency attitude has developed that, equates procedural
success with substantive success.26 The final outcome has
■ been ah agency that is responsive to the interest group that
amasses the most power and learns to "play the game" 'most
effectively.27
Utilizing science as a management tool is one thing;
having it dictate the ultimate decision is an entirely
different matter. If humans were motivated solely by
logical science, then scientific management would be an
.acceptable goal. Instead, they are motivated by an array of
factors: monetary, emotional, ethical and biological.
Distrust, of these external motivators has lead most public
land managers to utilize one tool in achieving the desired
Id..at 348.
Id.
26 One commentator argues' that the primary challenge 
behind implementing ecosystem management is maintaining
substantive integrity without diluting it to a' "mere 
procedural device." Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology 
and the Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 Chi-Kent L. 
Rev. 911, 931 (1994).
Nelson, supra note 11, at 348.
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result: command and control regulation:28
In economic terms, the impetus behind command and
control regulation is the failure of a market solution.
* < Market failures occur for many reasons: the existence of
negative externalities29, the free rider problem30 and/or
the lack of information.31 Government regulation is an
attempt to internalize these problems and achieve a superior
result. However, as the level of regulation increases,' so
does the level of bureaucratic control and the resulting
inefficiencies that arise from it.32
B. The Failure of Centralized Authority
Progressive Era science was a. centralizing vision.33 
It was believed that if science could solve the resource 
allocation dilemma, then that answer should be applied 
uniformly across the country. Furthermore, only the federal
- 28 Huf-fman-, supra note 19, at -426. On a more 
theoretical scale, the use of command and control regulation 
is also rooted in a distrust of capitalism (the incentive 
for -short term profit) that was a corollary to the 
Progressive Era. Id.
29 An externality is the uncompensated cost born by a 
third party that was not a market participant. Id. at 427; 
Douglas B ’ Rideout and Hayley Hesseln, Principles of Forest 
and Environmental Economics 7.9. (1995).
30 Huffman, supra note 19, at 43 0.
31 Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 7.10.
32 Id. at 7..11-7.12.
Nelson, supra note 10, at 13.
government was able to gather the resources and the 
expertise necessary to achieve a nationwide application.34 
Today, with the myriad of qomprehensive planning 
requirements,, the Forest Service is only becoming more 
centralized.35 This is.ironic, given the recent trend 
toward decentralization among other industries- and 
government functions.36 Besides being a very inefficient 
and costly structure,37 top down management can create two 
significant problems for the Forest Service: interest group 
.polarization and the inability to implement ecosystem 
management.
When public land decisions originate within a central 
authority in Washington, it only tends to exacerbate the 
already growing problem of interest group influence.
Because the number of interest groups that compete for 
forest resources are too numerous for any one to dominate, 
some commentators suggest that actual "agency capture" is 
impossible;38 Instead, these commentators explain that the 
Forest Service■utilizes a "multiple clientism" approach, 
whereby they pit constituents against one another in order
34 Id^.
35 Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
37 Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 7.12.
38 Randall Q'Toole, Reforming the Forest Service 109
(1988) .
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to achieve the desired political result.39
This adversarial system of interest group politics 
thrives ii> a centralized authority where victory is achieved 
by the group that has developed the best political machine. 
Eventually, polarization over public land issues results.40
Since the scale of decision is national, the individual 
members of the interest groups do not have to account for 
thfe on-the-ground impacts to their neighbor.
While the Forest Service is facing the problem of 
interest group polarization today, they will inevitably face 
another crisis in the future: how to implement adequate 
principles of ecosystem management. Depending on its 
interpretation, ecosystem management can either be a 
powerful new tool in public.land management or a re-hashed 
attempt at Progressive Era science.41 In contrast with 
Progressive Era scientific management, ecosystem management 
recognizes that scientists do not have complete knowledge of 
the interrelated processes that make ecosystems work.42
39 Id^
i .
40 'Randall O'Toole, Address at the 18th Annual Public 
Land Law Conference, Managing America's Public Lands: 
Proposals for the Future (October 24, 1996) (conference 
notes available from Public Land.& Resources Law Review).
41 Nelson, supra note 3, at 359.
42 Deborah M. Brosnan, Ecosystem Management: An
Ecological Perspective for Environmental Lawyers, 4 U. Balt. 
J. Envtl. L. 135, 147-148- (1994); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond 
the Boundary Line: Constructing a Laiw of Ecosystem 
Management; 65 U. Colo. L. Rev, 293, 322 (1994).
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Therefore, no one scientific answer exists. However, the
tension between the political arena and scientific
management is an old issue that will reemerge in
implementing ecosystem management.43
The difference between achieving on-the-ground changes
with ecosystem management or taking another ride on the
merry-go-round of Progressive Era scientific management may
lie in the decentralization of public land management.
Principles, of ecosystem management support an integrated,
organized approach to conservation and land management.44
However, while this a.pprpach may seem to favor centralized,
national management, theorists dismiss implementing
ecosystem management through top down management. A primary
concept of ecosystem management is that to manage at the
ecosystem level.managers must adopt a spatial and temporal
scale that correlates'to ecological processes.45
The broad aims of conservation biology are to 
support the functioning of a world composed of . 
semi-autonomous, self-organizing subsystems, which 
interact within a nested' hierarchy of larger 
systems. By logical extension, an ecosystem 
management approach not only tolerates but 
endorses a diverse array of semi-autonomous human
43 See Keiter, supra note 42 at 324 (arguing that, 
while scientific data is valuable in defining policy 
choices, there is no divorcing the underlying social values 
from resource allocations).
44 Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The 
Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands 
in Private' Ownership, 19 Vermont L. Rev. 363., 402 (1995) .
45 Keiter, supra note 2.6, at 929
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organizations--if they operate adaptively within 
the parameters of larger ecological systems. In a 
world where centralized government programs offer 
no easy solutions, the search for institutional 
arrangements has turned from unilateral, 
monolithic answers, to a consideration' of whether 
smaller-scale organizations might, through a 
network of voluntary agreements, coordinate and 
influence each others' activities "from the bottom 
up," instead of awaiting "top-down" national 
prescriptions.46
Management should be focused at a level that better equates
individual ecosystems with administrative boundaries.-47
Furthermore, for land managers to implement such a
politically charged management paradigm, it will have to be
sold to local constituents that will bear the costs of' such
an implementation. Contrary to some observations, local
people have much to contribute to the management of public.
lands. .
>
Ecosystem management will only occur if the decision process 
is decentralized and not .handed down from an unknown, 
bureaucrat in Washington.
C. The Failure of the Forest Service to Face Economic 
Realities
Shrouded in science, the Forest Service has long argued 
that, they are immune from the expectations that govern, 
private sectors, namely to turn a profit.48 As a
Lee P. Breckenridge, supra note 44, at 4 02. 
Nelson, supra note 3, at 3 61.
O'Toole, supra note 38, at 38-39.
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benevolent government entity, the Forest Service's role is 
to allocate multiple uses of. the public forests in accord 
with utilitarian principles. For example, the Forest 
Service frequently cites their commitment to maintaining 
community stability as an excuse for scheduling timber sales 
that lose money for the federal treasury.49 However, 
timber is not an entitlement; it is a commodity and the 
Forest Service's practices must be scrutinized as a business 
would be.50 This inefficient result is made even more 
maddening when environmental, degradation occurs concurrently 
with a net drain to the federal treasury. Ironically, this 
result has made unlikely allies of two very different 
interest groups: environmentalists and. economists.51
The most often cited example of economic inefficiency 
within the Forest Service is below-cost timber sales. 
Recently, the Wilderness Society charged that 1995 timber
49 William E,. Shands and Thomas Waddell, Below Cost 
Timber Sales in the Broad Context of National Forest 
Management 39 (1988).
50 See- generally O'Toole, supra note '3 8, at 112'. To 
further illustrate the lack of sound business practices 
within the Forest Service, Mr. O'Toole provides an analogy 
where General Motors applies the same accounting principles 
to the automobile industry that the Forest Service applies ' 
to timber. Id. at 26-27. The result of such an application 
would'be the sales of profitable models subsidizing the 
sales of unprofitable models. Id. So long as capital costs 
-were not included, a net profit would be realized.on paper.
Id.
Nelson, supra note 3, at 355.
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sales in the United States amounted to a $398 million 
loss.52 However, the timber industry hotly contests the 
results of such studies.53 This inflammatory rhetoric on 
both- sides only serves to cloud the issue and removes below- 
cost timber sales as a point of reform for the Forest 
Service.54
So the first question is: are below-cost timber sales 
actually occurring? Most economic studies55 of timber 
sales used a cash flow analysis to determine whether the
■s
costs of timber sales were exceeding the receipts for a 
single year.56 Generally, these studies have, found that, 
in the aggregate, receipts from timber sales on national
52 Groups Allege Logging's at a Loss, Missoulian, 
February 6, 1997, dt A3.
53 Id.
54 In the cited article above, the Wilderness Society 
accuses .industry of picking taxpayer's pockets while the 
American Forest & Paper Association accuses the Wilderness 
Society of not doing.a '
credible .analysis. Id.
55 Since 1980, comprehensive studies have been 
conducted by the/Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
Library of Congress, the Wilderness Society, Resources for 
the Future, and the General Accounting Office. O'Toole, 
supra note 38, at 28-37.
56 Shands and Waddell, supra note 49, at 19. .There 
are some inherent problems with analyzing cash flow for 
timber saleg because not all receipts are received in a 
single year and some
costs, .such as roads, need to be amortized, over the.life of 
the road. Id. Additionally, cash flow, accounting does not. 
account for the non-market costs such as aesthetics. Id.
17
forests exceed the costs.57 However, - when sales are 
broken down by individual region or individual timber sale, 
it is apparent that sales of' high valued old growth timber 
are subsidizing the sales of timber with marginal value.58 
The General Accounting Office recently found, using an 
accounting method that, they helped to design with the Forest 
Service, that for fiscal years 1992-1994, timber sale costs 
exceeded receipts across the country in every region.59
What causes below-cost timber sales? Different 
commentators have pointed to many problems inherent in the 
Forest Service as an explanation. It is probable that the 
real reason for below cost timber sales can be explained by . 
a combination of factors.
One of the primary causes identified for below cost
57 Id.
58 Id. at 19-20. However, even this may no longer be. 
the case as sales of old growth timber in the northwest have 
been significantly curtailed for the protection of spotted 
owl habitat. See GAO, Forest ServiceDistribution of 
Timber Sales Receipts Fiscal Years- 1992-1994, RCED-95-237FS 
(1995) reprinted in Different Drummer, Fall.1995, at 43 
(showing a net loss on the federal treasury for regions that 
encompass the Pacific Northwest).
59 Id. The GAO included as costs payments to 
associated funds, such as the Knutsen-Vandenburg fund, and 
25% payments.to the states that are required by law. Id. at 
40-42. Many supporters could argue that these payments 
serve as a legitimate function of the Forest Service mandate 
and serve many functions as community stability that are not 
valued. Shands and Waddell, supra note 49, at 22. In any 
event, the net effect on the treasury ■-of the U.S. is 
negative.
18
timber sales has been the process of budget maximization.60 
Unlike a business that is funded by profits, federal 
agencies are funded by tax dollars.61 Budgets are 
determined not by results, but by the perceived need and the 
satisfaction of powerful interest groups.62 The. larger the, 
budget, the more staff that can be hired and the greater 
prestige for the . agency.63
The drive for budget maximization is not to suggest 
some culpable motive by the Forest Service.64 It is more a 
natural outgrowth of federal agencies in general.65 
However, decentralizing the top-down management of the 
Forest Service and funding the agency out of user profits 
would go a long way in eliminating the incentive to sell 
timber at below ,cost .66
Another explanation for below-cost timber sales has 
been the Service's commitment to promoting a sustained
60 O'Toole, supra note 38, at 104-108; O'Toole, supra 
note 40, at 2.
61 O'Toole, supra note 27, at 104.
62 Id. at 104-105. When' studying timber sales, a 
Montana State economist found that below-cost timber sales 
allow the Forest Service to implement "harvesting activities 
across political jurisdictions", thus gaining favor with 
multiple legislators that decide the Forest Service Budget. 
Id.
63. Id̂ _ at 104,
64 Id. at 107.
65 Id. 107-108. ^
O'Toole, supra note,40, at 2-3.
yield-even flow gf timber to dependent communities. To 
understand the Forest Service's unending drive to achieve 
sustained yield, it is necessary to understand the 
historical forces that originally prompted the greation of 
the Forest Service in the -first place. Prior to the 1897 
Organic Act, industrial loggers practiced what can be 
characterized as a "cut-out and get-out" policy.67 Timber
was quickly harvested and the industry moved on to the next
)
merchantable stock;68 This method created the fear of a 
timber famine and finally lead to the creation of the timber 
reserves, the precursor to the national forests.69 The 
method by which community stability would be promoted and a 
timber famine averted was known as maintaining a "sustained 
yield.1,70
. In--scientific terms, sustained yield is -the point where 
the mean annual- increment of stumpage growth is maximized 
within a harvest rotation and regulations require that 
rotation ages be within 95% culmination of mean annual
67 Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 1.13.
68 Id.
69 Con H. Schallau and Richard M. Alston, The 
Commitment to Community Stability: A Policy or Shibboleth?, 
17 Envtl. L. 429, 433 (1987).
70 Sustained yield is.defined as "the achievement and 
maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular 
periodic output of the various renewable resources on the 
national forests without the impairment of the productivity 
of the land." Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 
U.S.C.A. §531(b) (1990)
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increment.71 This is a biological determination that does 
not account for the current market for stumpage or the 
capital costs of producing the stand.
■A corollary, to the concept of sustained yield is non­
declining even flow. If the amount of timber that could be 
produced was determined at a scientifically sustained level,' 
then the Forest Service could also guarantee a certain level 
of timber to local, mills and communities. As required by 
federal regulations, the Forest Service must guarantee that 
the harvest level of each decade be equal to or greater than - 
the harvest level of the previous decade.72
If the market for stumpage was constant from year, to 
year, a non-declining even flow policy may achieve some of 
the goals it is intended to achieve. However, a constant 
market for.stumpage does, not exist. Therefore, a non­
declining even flow policy can only be achieved by either 
below cost timber sales (when' supply exceeds demand) or by 
forgoing opportunities to sell timber at a profit (when 
demand exceeds supply) .73
Non-declining, even flow and sustained yield policies
71 36 C.F.R. §219.16(a)(2)(iii) (1996). Culmination 
of mean annual increment is where the average growth of the
■> stand is maximized. Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 
6 .1 0 .
72 3 6. C.F.R. § 219.16(a) (1) (1996) It is important
to remember that the rotation age of any particular timber 
stand maybe fifty years or more.
73 David Wear, et al., Even Flour Timber Harvests and 
Community Stability, 87 J. Forestry 24 (1989).
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were implemented as a response, to a perceived timber famine 
and issues of. community stability.74 However, neither of 
these issues are properly addressed by a non-declining, even 
flow policy and the continuance of this policy should be ' 
seriously questioned.
The predicted timber famine of the early 20th century 
has failed to materialize. With current public .opinion and 
existing environmental laws/ the cut-out and get-out 
policies of the turn of the century timber barons are 
forever a thing of the past: In fact, early implementations
of non-declining even flow were not so much a response to a 
timber famine but a timber glut.75 By controlling the 
amount of timber on the market with a low sustained yield, 
early managers hoped to change the market for stumpage from 
a buyers market to a sellers market.75
Community stability is often cited, as a primary goal 
of public forest management.77 However, noted forestry 
economists have concluded that the relationship between 
sustained yield and community stability is nothing more than 
"forestry lore", imported along with scientific management
74 Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 5.3.
75 Con H. Schallau, Sustained Yield Versus Community
Stability: An Unfortunate Wedding, 87 J. Forestry 16, 18
(1989) .
76 Id.
Schallau and Alston, supra note 69, at 429-430.
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from Europe.78 An economic analysis of non-declining, 
even flow reveals that the policy actually promotes 
instability. The total market for stumpage is comprised of 
public and private suppliers. A non-declining, even flow
policy does not account for the fluctuations of a dynamic/
market for timber.79 Instead, an inelastic supply of 
timber from National Forests is created that ignores price 
changes in the market for timber.80 When shocks to the 
market for stumpage occur81, the shock is only felt by the 
private supplier because of the inelastic supply of timber 
from public lands.82 This causes a greater decrease in the 
price (and consequently revenues) in the overall market .for 
timber than would actually occur if the market shock were 
absorbed by both private and public suppliers.83 The end 
result is community instability from widely fluctuating 
prices.
78 Id. at 444. These economists base their 
conclusions on the actual economic implications of sustained 
yield and not on any spcial welfare notions.
79 N Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 5.3.
80 Id.
81 An example of an exogenous shock to the market may 
be a decrease in demand for timber due to a boycott of 
lumber produced from old growth forests. See I d at 3.9 & 
3.12.
82 Id. at 5.5-5.8; Thomas R. Waggener, Some economic 
implications of Sustained Yield as a Forest Regulation Model 
13 (1969) .
83 Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 5.6-5.8; 
Waggener, supra note. 82, at 13-14.,
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In addition to the destabilizing economic implications
t
of a non-declining, even flow policy, many commentators 
argue, that community stability should not even be a goal of 
forest management. At a practical'level, community 
stability requires the maintenance of the status quo, 
resulting in the stagnation of economic growth.84 Indeed, 
the earliest attempts, at implementing a sustained yield 
cooperative unit failed because the community around which 
it was organized actually prospered.85 Furthermore, there, 
is evidence that there is a decreasing number of timber 
dependent communities because of diversification of local  ̂
economies.86
D. Conclusion- Failures of the Forest Service
The inherent problems facing the Forest Service are a 
product of the evolution of.the agency over the past 
century. Some of these problems are indicative of 
bureaucracies in general. 'Others are unique to the 
experience and founding philosophies of the Forest Service 
in particular. However, because these problems are all 
interwoven, no amount of individual exorcising will
84 Waggener, supra note 82, at 17.
85 Schallau, supra note 75, at 2 0 (examining the 
experience of the Shelton cooperative unit).
86 Shands and Waddell, supra note 49, at 40. For 
example, by diversifying their economy, the infamous Oregon 
community ..of Sweet Home is beginning to bounce back from the 
shut down of lumber mills from'spotted owl litigation. John 
G. Mitchell, In the Line of Fire: Our National Forests, . 
National Geographic, March 1997, at 82.
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significantly reform the Forest Service... Therefore it is 
■necessary that a fundamental paradigmatic shift be made in 
the Forest Service to send a clear mandate to the agency as 
to how our public timber resources are managed.
III., State Trust Management
The Forest Service is not the only game in town. In 
the west, nearly forty-one million acres of land is managed 
by the states as part of their school land grants.87 Not. 
all of these lands are primarily valuable for timber. In 
New Mexico and Wyoming, school grant lands are- very valuable 
for mineral deposits.88 However, in Washington, Oregon 
and Idaho, state trust, forests produce large revenues for 
the state's permanent fund.89 Additionally, these lands 
have very high recreational value, especially when they 
border high density visitor areas like Grand Teton National 
Park.90 In addition to the economic value of these lands, 
state trust lands are also home to areas with high' 
environmental values due to endangered species habitat or
87 Fairfax et al. , supra note 5, at 832.
88 Melinda Bruce and Teresa Rice, Controlling the
Blue Rash: Issues and Trends in State Land Management, 29 
Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 8. Mineral and oil and gas 
royalties on these lands produce about 175 million for both 
states..
89 Id. at 9. For Washington alone, 1990 timber
revenues were $225 million.
90 Id*, at 11.
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other unique attributes.91
A. Trust Principles in the Context of Public Land 
Management
I will argue that a general trust management scheme 
would be beneficial to forest management, not that state 
trust management' should be extended to include national 
forests. Therefore the;historical evolution of state trust
land management is not as important as an understanding of
! '
the interplay that trust principals have on on-the-ground 
management.92
Imposing a trust on the managers of public lands 
elevates .the manager's responsibility to that of a 
fiduciary.93 The trustee must manage the trust fpr the 
benefit of a,described beneficiary class following certain 
prescribed rules and duties, among them: the duty to 
exercise skill and prudence in caring for the.trust, the 
duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries, the duty to 
disclose, the duty to protect and preserve trust property., 
and the duty, to make the trust productive.?4
Some of these duties are conflicting and require
91 JjL. at 12.
92 In any event, the history of the land grant 
program and the resulting school trust lands have been 
exhaustively examined elsewhere. See Fairfax, et al., supra 
note 5, at 803-841 (1992).
93 Id. at 851.
Id. at 851-852.
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careful balancing on the part of the trustee. For the 
purposes of land management, the duties that are most 
important are the duty to preserve the trust and the duty to ' 
make the trust productive. In trust law, when these two 
duties conflict a trustee must act as a "prudent investor" 
would.
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of 
the trust or by statute, the trustees are under a 
duty to make such investments as a prudent man 
would make of his own property having primarily in 
view the preservation of the trust estate and the‘ 
amount and regularity of income to be derived.95
This rule has since been modified somewhat by the
Restatement and renamed as the "unconstrained" Prudent
Investor rule.96 This rule states that the trustee must
manage trust assets' as a prudent investor would taking into
account the context of the individual investment in relation
to the trust portfolio as a whole.97 For the most part,
courts have only taken into account one side of the
equation: current income .for the trust.98 However, if the
beneficiary class is expanded and courts becpme more aware
of the competing nature of uses, the application of the
95 • IVA William F. Fratcher , -Scott on Trusts §389 
(1989). This is the same rule regardless of whether it is a 
charitable or private trust.
96 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227(a); Tacy 
Bowlin, Rethinking the ABC's of Utah's School Trust Lands,
1994 Utah L. Rev. 923, 948 (1994).
97 Bowlin, supra note 96, at 948..
See Id. at 943-55.
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. ) 
prudent investor rule could become a beneficial mandate for
public land management.
B. How the Trust has been Treated by the Courts.
Despite the very different enabling acts and 
constitutions that established state trust lands,'the courts 
have treated the trust relationship relatively the same from 
state to state." This is because early Supreme Court 
cases addressing the trust relationship came from Arizona 
and New Mexico and these cases have, in turn, been cited as 
precedent in state courts.100 While this mistake of 
history has been a., source of criticism for some 
commentators,101 it is also a point of commonality which 
makes the jurisprudence in this legal area comparable across 
state borders. .
Two common threads seem to generally line cases in the 
state trust context.102 State trust managers are both ' 
trustees, with a higher standard of care, and bureaucrats 
that are traditionally afforded some degree of discretion.
99 Fairfax et al. , supra note 5, at 842.
100 Id. at 843; See e.g. Lassen v. Arizona. 3 85 U.S. 
458- (1966). The enabling acts for the individual state 
school trust lands were all very different from one another. 
However, by citing these Supreme Court cases, state.courts 
have imported Arizona's and New Mexico's enabling acts into 
the state's common law.
101 See Bowlin, supra note 96, at 930-931.
Fairfax et al . , supra note 5, at 848.
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In the.vast majority of cases, the issue could be framed as 
a dispute over how the lessee works the land. If the 
challenger to the state's authority is a lessee, court's 
have accorded the trustee discretion in how the land is 
managed.103 However, if the challenger is a beneficiary, 
stricter notions of trust law are imputed to the 
trustee.104
Because most challenges brought by the beneficiary^ 
centered on the disposition of ,trust assets for less than 
full value by the trustee, the cases tend to emphasize 
income maximization as the dominant duty of the trust.105 
For example, in State v. University of Alaska106, the state 
included trust lands within state park boundaries without 
compensating the trust. The court held that including the
lands within the1 park placed unconstitutional restrictions
on the ability of the lands to produce income for the 
beneficiary-university.107 The duty of the state with 
regard to the lands was to maximize the economic return to
103 Id. at 848-849.
104, Id. at 849.
105 However, if "the issue involves the misuse of trust 
lands by a lessee, courts have had little difficulty 
upholding a decision by the trustee to prevent the 
destruction of trust assets under the guise of income 
maximization. See Winchell v. Dent of State Lands. 785 P.2d 
212, 216 (Mont. 1990) (overgrazing of state land by lessee 
necessitates cancellation of lease).
106 624 P.2d 807, 809-810 (Alaska 1981).
107 icL_ at 813 .
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the beneficiary.108
These cases have fed the fears that" many 
environmentalists have with state management. When the 
duties of making the trust productive and the duties of 
preserving the trust conflict, most critics of trust 
management feel that courts will only uphold the alternative 
that maximizes current income for the schools'.109 While 
there is some evidence for this sentiment in court opinions, 
the full scope of the trust model should instill confidence 
in'many environmentalists.. Recent decisions in the state 
trust context have included language that includes the 
competing duty of the trustee to preserve the trust.
To- begin with, the heightened duty imposed on trustees 
by the courts eliminate many of the current problems found 
within current Forest Service management. The duty of 
loyalty would virtually eliminate subsidized resources given 
away to extractive industries.110 Furthermore, trusts are 
typically-self-sustaining and not dependant on the budget
108 Id.
109 Bowlin, supra note 96, at 939-940.
110■ . See Oklahoma Education Assoc, v. Nigh. 642 P.2d 
230, 236 (Okl. 1982) (use of school trust lands to subsidize 
farming and ranching is a breach of the trust); County of 
Skamania v. Washington. 685 P .2d 576 (Wash. 1984) (use of 
school trust lands to subsidize timber industry is-a breach 
of the trust).
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appropriations whims of • Congress.111 Therefore, the ;
incentive to allocate .trust resources in. an environmentally 
damaging way is minimized.
These issues are well settled with courts and are a 
function of'the trust paradigm itself. They did not require 
the active representation of environmental interests to 
achieve an environmentally; friendly result. The duty to 
maximize income- did not conflict with preservation of the 
trust corpus. However; as these duties begin to conflict, 
courts are beginning to grapple with the emerging knowledge 
that short term economic returns are not always the most 
prudent course of action for the trust.
One possible explanation for the unequal emphasis on 
the duty to maximize,income can be found in standing. 
Strictly construed, environmental groups do not have 
standing to challenge trustee actions unless they are a 
lessee.112 The school districts, not the parents of 
individual school children serve' as the representatives for
111 Jon A. Souder, Sally K. Fairfax, & Larry Ruth, , 
Sustainable Resources Management and State School Lands: The 
Quest for Guiding Principles, 34 Nat. Resources J. 271, 292 
(1994); Moon v. State Board of Land Commissioners. 724 P.2d 
125', 129 (Idaho 1986) (use of ten percent of trust, revenues 
for maintenance of trust do not constitute a. breach of the 
trust). .
112 Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc. Inc. v.. State, 899
P.2d 949, 952 (Idaho 1995). However, these groups have been 
successful' in challenging trustee decisions, based on other 
grounds such as public trust doctrine, Id. at .955, or under 
unique state doctrines, National Parks and Conservation 
Assoc, v. Board of State Lands. 869 P.2d 909, 913 (1993).
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the beneficiary.113 Without anyone asserting an interest 
in conserving the corpus of the trust over production.of 
income, the court's have had little opportunity to develop a 
jurisprudence to address these conflicting duties.
However, in National Parks and Conservation 
Association114, the Utah Supreme' Court was squarely faced 
with a direct conflict between the duty to preserve the 
trust and the duty to produce maximum income. In that case,
f
environmental- groups sought to challenge the decision by the 
Utah Board of State Lands to exchange trust lands within a 
national park for county lands.115 - The county intended to 
pave a road running through the trust lands for greater 
tourist access to the surrounding area.116 The NPCA 
challenged the exchange on the grounds that, the Board 
determined that it could not "give preference to scenic, 
aesthetic, or recreational values over income maximization 
in managing school trust lands."117 The Court upheld the 
Board's determination holding that the trust was not created 
for the general welfare of the people.118
113 Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc.. 899 P.2d at 952..
114 869 P.2d at 909.
•15. icL at 911.
116 IdL at 911.
117 Id. at 916.
118 Id. at 919'. The Court went on to specifically 
deny that the.enabling act created a public trust instead of 
the traditional private trust.
32
While the holding in National Parks and Conservation 
Association has been criticized11-9, the Court in dicta 
began the long road to reconciling the conflicting trust 
duties of income maximization and preservation of the trust. 
Specifically the Court held that long term income potential 
must not be sacrificed for short term profits-.120 
Furthermore, where possible, income production must be 
accomplished so as. not to sacrifice unique scenic or 
cultural values.121
Nat-ional Parks and Conservation Association upholds the 
traditional notion of income production of state .trust lands 
while recognizing the merit of preserving the corpus of the 
trust. However,' as the Court in that case also recognized, 
trust management must be accomplished within the confines of 
existing law.122 Therefore, if other statutes mandate that 
environmental values are to be protected, then trust 
management must conform to those values.123
119 See Bowlin, supra note 96, at 934-045.
120 National Parks and Conservation Assoc. . 869 P.2d
at 921. -
121 Id. However, the court went on to hold that, in 
the. final analysis, state lands must be income productive.
If that would cause a' complete loss of aesthetic value, then 
the trustee'should attempt to exchange the land for more 
productive lands. Id.
122 isL at 920.
123 However, because the origins of state trust lands
arise from state constitutions, these laws must be
constitutional if they are to provide limitations to the 
duty to produce income. See Board of Natural Resources v.
In Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners v.
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Colorado Mined Land. Reclamation Board124, the Conda Mining 
Co. sought a permit to expand its mining operations on' 
school trust land. Obviously, this expansion would have 
maximized the amount of income the lands were producing for 
• the trust. However, because of local zoning regulations 
designed to protect the wildlife and character of the 
community, Conda was denied a permit to expand its mine.125 
Conda sought a declaratory judgement that counties could not 
constitutionally exercise zoning authority over school trust 
lands.126 The Court disagreed with Conda holding that
[T]he State Land Board "must first look to the 
statutes ascertain the regulations prescribed, and 
then, in exercising their constitutional powers, 
they must so act as in the judgement.of the board 
will secure the maximum amount, under the 
prescribed regulations." . . . The constitutional
scheme does not contemplate that the State Land 
Board can ignore a reasonable legislative 
regulation for the purpose of carrying out its 
constitutional responsibility of securing "the 
maximum amount possible" for public lands."127
A similar case arose in Montana where an environmental
organization sued the trustee for failing to complete an
Brown,, w a  i .zd u/, 943 (9th Cir. 1993) (law designed to
conserve forests by banning timber exports from state 
forests is constitutional despite large economic loss to 
■ school.trust) .
124 8 0 9 P.2d 974, 978 ('Col. 1991).
125 Id. at 978.
126 Id̂ _ at 985. .
127 Id.
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environmental impact statement before modifying a grazing
lease on trust land.128 The lessee wished to change his
lease in order to graze domestic sheep instead of cattle in
an area adjacent to a bighorn sheep range.129 The trustee
argued, inter alia, that its ability to deny a lease based
on environmental concerns is limited by its duty to maximize
income for the trust.130 The Court held that while income
maximization is a consideration of the trustee, it is not ,
the oniy consideration.131
MEPA requires that ̂ an agency be informed when it 
balances preservation against utilization of our 
natural resources and trust lands.. The DSL may 
not, as here reach a decision without first 
engaging in the requisite significant impacts 
analysis.132
These two cases illustrate that the trustee's duty to 
maximize income for the benefit of the current beneficiary 
is not a loophole for trustees to avoid environmental 
protections that other land managers also have to comply 
with.
It is unfortunate that the duty to make the trust
128 Ravalli Countv Fish & Game Assoc. . Inc. v. Montana 
Department of' State Lands. 903 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Mont. 1995).
129 Id. at 1365-66.
130 Id. at 1370. However, the real issue in this case 
was not whether DSL could modify the lease, but whether they 
could modify the lease without first examining the 
environmental impacts of- the modification. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1371.
productive has received top billing in court opinions 
because it has led to a general mistrust of state -management 
by environmentalists. In theory, the challenge of the 
trustee is to balance the duties of income production and 
preservation of the trust. . As the preservation interests 
become represented more often in lawsuits and the economic 
potential of scenic beauty and recreation are increasingly 
recognized, this balance should be restored to the 
management perspective. As a lowest common denominator,'the 
duty to make the trust productive does not suspend the 
trustee's responsibility to comply with existing 
environmental protection laws, assuming those laws are 
constitutional.
C. Possible Benefits of Trust Management 
over Current Federal Management
Managing public lands as a trust requires that the 
entire paradigm of current management be abandoned. Section 
II outlines many of the fundamental problems with the 
current Forest Service paradigm. By shifting, management to. 
a trust paradigm, the unclear and conflicting mandates of 
Progressive Era science could be achieved.133 Instead of
1,33 It is impracticable to assume that no
"Progressively" trained foresters will be employed as 
trustees. Indeed* current Forest Service employees still have 
much to offer to resource management. The current problems 
found in national forest service management is more a problem 
with the overall centralized system than with individual 
Forest Service employees.
controlling the equation, science would be one tool that 
managers will use to determine how to best fulfill their 
duties as trustee for the resource.
Infusing trust principles that have a well established 
common law has caused state land managers to accept four 
characteristics of trustee management: clarity, 
accountability, enforceability, and perpetuity.134 Each of 
these characteristics could have enormous positive impact on 
future forest management.. Furthermore,.trust principles 
foster economic efficiency while also facilitating ,the shift 
to ecosystem management.
Unlike ambiguous multiple use mandates, trust 
principles are relatively clear where lands are managed to 
meet specific goals for' named beneficiaries.135 As 
management objectives become more blurred as demands on the 
resource becomes greater, clarity in mandates are going to 
be critical in preventing mismanagement. As some 
commentators explained, " [c] larity, we. assert permits- tying 
resource management tq the achievement of objectives. This 
linkage is particularly crucial when dealing with, 
potentially imprecise concepts such as sustainability. "136'
Trustees are accountable to the beneficiaries through 
clearly measurable goals, the duty to disclose, and the duty
134 Souder, et al., supra, note 111, at 278-279.
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of . undivided loyalty.137 In particular, accountability 
makes it very difficult to divert trust assets for the 
benefit of the manager so as to maximize budgets. An 
examination of the allocation of personnel and resources to 
particular management prescriptions on state lands revealed 
that beneficiaries can identify and force trustees to manage 
lands in the most economically efficient manner.138 
Furthermore, if budgets are tied to actual revenues, and not 
state legislatures, sustainable management is possible.139 
Trust accountability would go a long way in eliminating the 
economic inefficiencies in current.Forest Service 
management. This concept of accountability makes, it a 
breach of- the trust to allow the use of trust assets to 
subsidize users. Below cost timber■sales in the name of 
community stability would be inconsistent with trust 
principles, unless the communityAwas a direct beneficiary of 
the trust.
. Of all of the characteristics of trust management, 
enforceability is the most well established. Countless , 
cases have developed a common law that is fairly analogous
137 Id. at 286.
*
138 IcL.' at 286-290.
139 Id. at 292. Western trust lands budgets are 
typically funded in-one of three, ways: 1). determination 
politically by the legislature; 2) ,a fixed, predetermined 
percentage of revenues; and 3) no fixed budget, where costs 
are directly deducted from revenues and the remainder given 
to the beneficiaries.
to resource management issues.140 As public interest 
groups are beginning t<p assert more of a stake in state land 
management issues, these standards are evolving as well to 
accept more contemporary notions of preservation.141 When 
weighing alternatives in the natural resource context, 
courts treat trustees with less deference than the would 
normally be given to public land administrators, thus making 
judicial enforceability more1 of a reality in the trust 
: paradigm than in the current agency context.142
Perpetuity directly reflects the conflicting trust 
duties of maintaining the trust assets and producing income 
for the current beneficiaries. Some commentators argue that 
, this conflict has given rise to a conservative management 
style.143 This notion of a direct relationship between 
"perpetual revenue production" and "perpetual capacity of 
lands to produce" provides strong tools for larid managers to 
avoid special interests that would like to see short term 
revenue production maximized.144
Another primary benefit to a trust management regime 
would be the creation of incentives to manage forests for 
economic efficiency. ", In a side by side comparison/ state
140' Idj_ at 2 93 .
141 See Section IIIB, above.
142 Souder et al. , supra note 111, at 295.
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forests fair much better economically than national forests. 
In a study by the Political Economy Research Center (PERC)., 
state forests in Montana generated a $ 13.3 million return 
-while national forests in Montana yielded a loss of $42 
million.145 The reason for this disparity is that state 
forests are managed more efficiently for both costs and ' 
revenues. State forests in Montana spend two and a half 
times less money than the nearby Gallatin National Forest 
spends in preparing timber sales..146 From 1978-1983, state 
forests in Montana received much higher revenues for timber 
sold.147 These dramatic economic differences were not
145 Donald R. Leal, PERC Policy Series: Turning a 
Profit on Public Forests 4-5 (1995). This is despite the 
fact that twenty /times the timber was harvested on national 
forests than on state forests.
146 Id. at 8. This difference can not be explained by 
a lower burden of* environmental review by state agencies. 
Most states have some version of NEPA that requires the 
trustee to perform a similar level of, environmental review. 
See Ravalli County Fish & Game Assoc., Inc., 903 P.2d at 
1371. . One commentator has demonstrated that some states, at 
least in the short run, are very efficient at allocating 
personnel to projects that receive the highest margin of 
return. Souder et al at 288-289.
147 Leal, supra note 145, at 10-11; David H. Jackson, 
Why Stumpage Prices Differ Between Ownerships: A Statistical 
Examination of State and Forest Service Sales in Montana, 18 
Forest Ecology and Management 219 (1987). Professor Jackson 
offers two -explanations for this disparity. First, the 
Forest Service primarily employs clear cutting, resulting in 
both high and low value timber harvested. However, the 
state employs more selective cutting, harvesting only high 
value timber. Second, because the Forest Service timber 
sales are so high in volume, more capital costs, such as 
road construction, have to be incurred and bids are lower 
than competing state sales. Recent studies indicate that 
the Forest Service may have corrected for some of these 
problems because average stumpage prices in 1993 between the
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achieved at the price of environmental quality either. A. 
1992 study found that logging practices -employed on state 
forests protected the watershed better than logging 
practices on national forest land.148
While not a perfect fit, individual forest trusts could 
also facilitate the procedural shift to ecosystem 
management. Three dominant themes must be embraced by land 
managers utilizing ecosystem management: 1) boundaries" must 
coincide with ecological processes, not politics, 2) 
scientific uncertainty must be accepted, and 3). governance 
of the ecosystem must not be ad hoc through a multitude of 
agencies.149 A trust would be able to embody these themes 
better than the current hodge podge of federal and state 
agencies.150 Trust boundaries could easily coincide with
state and national forests were nearly equal. Leal, supra 
note 14 5, at 11.
148 Leal, supra note 145, at 11. This, is not to
suggest that state forests are more ecologically healthy
than national forests. Because state forests are so 
disjointed, it is doubtful even that they enjoy a large 
amount of biodiversity. ' However, the study does serve to 
illustrate that economic efficiency can be achieved without 
wholesale disregard of the environment.
149 Thomas T. Ankerson & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem
Management and the Everglades: A Legal and Institutional
Analysis, 11 J. Land Use& Envtl L. 473, 475-476 (1996)..
150 Ecosystem management is currently being pursued ' 
through both "hard management", where one agency manages an 
entire ecosystem, and "soft management" where management is 
accomplished through multiple agencies cooperating. Id. at 
502. A single, managing authority will eliminate conflicting 
mandates that can stall soft management.
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individual watersheds.151
To implement ecosystem management, the prudent investor 
rule would have to be reconciled with the concept of 
scientific uncertainty.- However, the trust concept does not 
presuppose perfect knowledge. In fact, trusts by nature are 
conservative and not entrepreneurial institutions. This 
would lead to management that generally embraces a 
"precautionary principle" where managers would act to ensure 
that environmental harm does not occur.152 In trust 
language, the trustee must act to insure that the corpus of 
the trust is protected. These two principles are actually 
■ closely related.
Despite these, possible benefits of trust management, 
there are some deep criticisms of trust management. Most of 
these criticisms center on the "income maximization" 
principles currently recognized'by the courts in regard to 
school trusts.153 However, there is really no. reason for
151 Id. at 476-479. The problem with defining an 
appropriate scale for ecosystem management is that no 
spatial level will adequately cover all species. Id. at 
478. Larger ecosystem units (sometimes called "greater 
ecosystems) that span many watersheds will fall into the 
same overcentralization problem that plagues the current 
forest service. Therefore, it.is best to limit trusts to 
watersheds, the ecosystem unit suggested by the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service.
152 Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the 
Precautionary Principle, Environment, Sept. 1991, at 4.
153 Steve Alder, Some Pitfalls with Government Land 
Trusts, Different Drummer, Fall 1995, at 47; John Arum, Old 
Growth Forests on School Lands- Dedicated to Oblivion?- 
Private Trust Theory and the Public Trust, 65 Wash. L. Rev.
environmentalists to shy away from the trust concept in 
regards to land management. The principle of the trustee as 
a "prudent investor" will ensure sustainable development of 
public lands in. perpetuity. Courts, in examining state 
trust management, are beginning to reconcile the competing 
trust duties of managers as the income maximization 
principle is slowly eroding. Furthermore, the creation of 
federal forest trusts does not have to be governed by the 
same principles currently found in the enabling acts, for 
state school trusts. In fact, these critics acknowledge 
that trusts could be created that provide better protection 
for wilderness values.154
IV. Creating a Federal Forest Trust.
Constructing a trust manaigement paradigm is as simple 
and'as■complicated as reinventing the Forest. Service. , The 
only available model for such a large scale land trust is 
the states. However, there are many pitfalls in the 
evolution of the State lands program and also many
dissatisfied users of these state lands. Therefore, a
/ '
wholesale adoption of the .state program is not practicable 
and many improvements of the state paradigm can be made if 
such a trust system was to be implemented. As a departure 
for this analysis, I will utilize the "National Forest
151 (1990) .
154 Alder, supra note 153, at 47-48.
Reform Proposal" offered by the Thoreau Institute as a' model 
for implementing a trust paradigm on federal forest 
management.155
A. Requirements of a Trust
Generally, in' order to create a trust, there must be 1) 
a manifest intent to create a trust, 156 2) some trust 
property, 157 3 ) some trust purpose, 158 4) a 
beneficiary,159 and 5) must, be in writing in some form to 
satisfy the statute of frauds.160 Based on established 
common law in the context of state school trust lands,161 
there can be little doubt that a national forest trust can 
be created. Any bill that creates a trust would have to 
intend to do so, however no particular language is necessary 
to manifest that intent.162 A trust can be created for any 
purpose that is not illegal.163 Any national forest trust
155 Reprinted in Different Drummer, -Fall 1.995, at 44- 
46. The edited version, hereinafter the National Forest 
Trust Act, is included as Appendix I.
156 Restatement (Third) of Trusts §23.
157 IcL at §66.
158 Id. at §59.
159 IcL. at §66 .
160 IcL. at §40.
161 Fairfax et al., supra note 5, at 850-91.,
162 Restatement (Third) of Trusts §24; See National 
Forest Reform Act §4 (e), below.
163 Restatement (Third) of Trusts §59.
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would be created for the purpose of ensuring that the 
national forests were managed in the most economically 
efficient manner while protecting the environmental 
quality.164 The trust property, the' national forests, and 
the writing requirements are also easily identified.
By far the most problematic aspect of creating a trust 
is naming a beneficiary. The primary requirement of naming 
a beneficiary is that it is definitively ascertainable.165 
Given that, in theory., national forests belong to every 
citizen of the United States, managing lands "in trust for 
the people of the United States" may at first seem an 
-appropriate beneficiary. However, it would be ill advised to 
have such an inclusive beneficiary for a number of reasons.
First, the beneficiary class should not be so large as 
to encompass too many people,. For a trustee to manage the 
forests in trust for a beneficiary class with many competing 
needs would sacrifice the clarity of the trust mandates. It 
would be very difficult for a trustee to ascertain and 
balance the competing needs.166 Standing to seek redress 
for trustee decisions would be granted to a very large group 
of plaintiffs.
164 See National Forest Reform Act §2, below.
165 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 112.
166 Conflicting mandates are actually a problem that 
current public land managers, face. James Brown, The Forest 
Service Needs a Clear Mandate, Different DrummerFall 1995, 
at 31.
Second, use of the phrase "in trust for the people of 
the United States" denotes the public trust doctrine.167 
There are, considerable differences between public trust 
doctrine and private trusts and the two should not be 
confused. While the public trust doctrine has provided a 
successful theory on which to provide some protection for 
natural resources168-, it is not expansive enough to provide 
guidance in the national forest context.* The public trust 
doctrine, while it has expanded in recent years to include 
other resources169, it has mostly been limited to resources 
with some nexus to navigable waters. Therefore^ there is no 
established precedent to apply to the multitude of resources 
that make up the corpus of the trust. Second, while the 
public trust doctrine has received increasing support from 
courts170, there are many commentators that predict its 
demise.171 Basing a reform of the Forest Service on a less
167 For example, Article XVI of the Washington state 
constitution provides that " [a]11 the public lands granted 
to' the state are held in trust for all of the people."
Wash. Const, art XVI,. § 1.
168 See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of 
Alpine County. 658 P. 2d 709. (Calif. 1983) (the Mono Lake 
litigation).
169 See Wade v . Kraemer. 459 N.E.2d 1025 (111.
.1984)(applying the doctrine to wildlife).
170 George A. Gould and Douglas L. Grant, Water Law 510, 
note 1 (1995). •
171 Id. ’at 511-512, note 3 and the references cited 
therein.
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than solid legal doctrine is inadvisable.172
Of course this begs the question: who should be the 
beneficiary? However, no hard and, fast answers emerge. The. 
beneficiary class should be limited.enough so that actual 
measurable objectives can be formulated and loyalty to the 
beneficiary is not expanded to the point that it has little 
meaning. A preference for local beneficiaries over national 
ones could also be advantageous as a method to decentralize 
management and account more for the costs of management 
decisions on local constituencies. However, this would 
necessitate people to -recognize that "public lands" do not 
mean what they once did.173
For lack of a clear choice, I recommend-adopting the 
same beneficiary as the states- the public schools. This 
would limit the beneficiary to a class of people that have" 
both short term and long term needs of the trust. Balancing 
competing trustee duties would be easier and mandates would 
remain clear. Generally, public schools do not have an 
immediate, direct stake in land management decisions as 
compared to industry or environmentalists. Furthermore, a 
common law defining the scope' of the beneficiary already . 
exists. A portion of national forest revenues in the
172 ' Private trust theory, however,, has an established 
common law and is widely accepted.
173 Instituting a preference for local beneficiaries 
over national ones would probably cause a larger outcry than 
is actually deserved and represents the unwillingness for 
special interests to give up any "turf" that they control.
47
federal treasury aiready are allocated to public education. 
Naming public schools as the beneficiary would only 
eliminate the "middle man" of congressional appropriations 
and ease the burden on states.174
The question of who will be the beneficiary of a 
national forest trust will be the focus of considerable 
debate and likely stall any attempts to apply trust 
principles to forest management for some time. While the 
public schools as a beneficiary could be a compromise, it is 
not the only possibility. .However,' any attempts to further, 
define the beneficiary class in the future should take great 
care to avoid the problems with an over-expansive 
beneficiary class outlined above.
B. The National Forest Trust Act
In order to incorporate the issues outlined above, 
significant changes were made to the Thoreau Institute 
model. However, the general purpose of creating a national 
forest trust,, "to ensure that the Nation's renewable forest 
and rangeland resources be managed so as to provide the 
greatest economic efficiency, environmental quality, and 
responsiveness to public demand", is the same for both 
models.
Sections 1 through 3 of the National Forest Trust Act
174 While definitely an argument against naming public 
schools as the beneficiary, the relative merit of public 
funding of education is beyond the scope of this paper.
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are self explanatory and do not require elaboration. 
Beginning with Section 4- the Act is makes substantive . 
changes. Section 4(a) provides that the Secretary of 
Agriculture redraw national forest boundaries to approximate 
the boundaries of watersheds.
The Thoreau Bill originally divides land into Forest Trusts 
and Wilderness Trusts and divides their management 
accordingly.175 For the purposes of this revision, I
have included wilderness lands in the National Forest Units 
in an attempt to maintain the integrity of a watershed and 
provide continuity in management.
The Thoreau Bill also, provided no guidance for drawing 
boundaries besides limiting the units to between one to, six 
million acres in size.176 This subsection mandates that 
boundaries be based on individual watersheds, more 
approximating an appropriate scales for effective ecosystem 
management. By allowing the boundaries to be redrawn with 
no regard to political boundaries, this clause would create 
National Forest units that spread across more than one 
state. This may cause some difficulty in determining which 
state trust law to apply to each individual unit. However, 
the federal courts can easily develop a federal common law • 
with regard to National Forest Units. Additionally, because 
of cases such as Lassen, much of the individual state
175 Thoreau Institute, supra, note 155, at 44.
176 , Id.
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precedent- is already very similar.177
In order to provide some continuity of management while 
individual trust units are drawn, section 4, subsection b, 
allows the -secretary to name an interim supervisor for each 
unit. The interim supervisor will be responsible for 
arranging the members of the forest trust to\elect a 
governing board.
Section 4, subsection c creates.the trust responsible 
for managing the trust, subject to defined principles. This 
subsection allows for any citizen of the United States to 
become a member of the trust for a nominal fee. This clause 
is identical to the Thoreau model. By- allowing anyone to 
become a member of the trust, it expands the class of 
potential plaintiffs and diminishes the standing problems at 
issue in Selkirk-Priest Basin Association.178 However, the 
ability .of any one plaintiff to sue the trust would be 
governed by corporate .law and stockholder rights.
Section 4, subsection e is mandates that the national
forest units be managed in trust for the public schools of
the United States. The Thoreau model originally states that
the National Forest Units will be held "in trust for the
people of the United States." 179 This language actually
creates a. "public trust" with the possible difficulties 
  _________
177 See note 100.
178 8 9 9’ P. 2d at 952 ,
179 Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 45.''
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explained above.180 Limiting the beneficiary class to the 
public schools creates a private charitable trust with an 
established,common law.
This subsection also mandates that management shall be 
in accordance with established trust principles, ecosystem 
management, and established federal law. The original 
Thoreau model stated that management "shall be in accordance 
with accepted multiple use and sustained yield principles, 
and shall b,e aimed at producing the greatest good for the 
greatest number for the longest period of time."181 This 
language would only serve to further entrench the . 
established theories of Progressive science by grounding 
them in law. Inserting language that places the emphasizes- 
the trustees duties provides a clean legal break with 
Progressive Era notions. Furthermore, the competing duties 
.of making the trust productive and preserving the corpus of 
the trust are given equal weight in this language, 
eliminating the authority for one sided judicial 
interpretations focusing on "maximization of income." While 
this subsection also mandates that principles of ecosystem 
■management be utilized in managing the trust. However, it 
does not mandate.any substantive result.
As already established by current trust law, trust 
management must comply with current environmental protection
■ 180 See section IVA, above.
181 Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 45.
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laws.182
Section.4, subsection'f outlines the powers given to 
the board. These powers included the ability hire and fire 
trust personnel, including the supervisor, the power to 
approve an operating plan, and the power to set membership 
fees. Subsection g allows the board to set fees to use 
forest units at market value. This provision is crucial if 
a market for alternative uses of the National Forest Unit is 
to be recognized. User fees for recreation and other non­
consumptive activities will make it possible for a trustee 
to make the trust productive for the beneficiary while also 
preserving the corpus'of the trust.
Disposal of the trust corpus is forbidden by section 4, 
subsection h. However, the board can exchange'land of equal 
value if the exchange will ease the management of the trust. 
Also, the board can approve a land acquisition in order to. 
make the trust more valuable both economically and 
ecologically. Habitat fragmentation has been identified as 
one of the greatest threats to biodiversity worldwide.183 
This clause was inserted to enable the Board of Trustees to 
actively pursue the acquisition of lands that- are part of 
the ecosystem they are managing, but outside the current
182 See Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners.
809 P.2d at 985; Ravalli County Fish & Game Assoc'. . 903 P.2d 
at 1370.
• ■ \
183 Reed F. Noss and Allen Y. Cooperrider, Saving 
Nature's Legacy 51 (1994).
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boundaries of the National Forest Unit in order to connect
habitats that are fragmented.
Section 4, subsection j gives the power to revoke the 
charter of any forest trust to the federal judiciary. The 
Thoreau model gave this power to Congress.184 This clause
v  ' -
was changed, giving this power to the judicial branch, for 
two reasons. First, Congress is very accommodating of the 
desires of individual interest groups and placing this . 
power with them may not be wise. Utilization of this power 
could be,inconsistent depending on the perceived needs of a. 
constituency and the desire of a politician to be reelected. 
Second, unless the National Forest Trust Act was grounded in 
the Cpnstitution, it is .unclear what kind of judicial review
could be obtained for Congress' notions of "gross
malfeasance". However, an established chain of appeals is 
provided by giving this power to the' judicial branch.
Section 4, subsection k states that if the unit is 
unable to sustain itself, the board of trustees may transfer 
the lands in the trust to jurisdiction of another trust 
willing to undertake its management. This would occur when
l
a trust is created that has only marginal sustainable 
economic value. While this subsection may break up 
ecosystems, the trust must first be self sustaining in order 
to provide adequate management.
Section 5 controls the budgeting and financing of the
184 Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 44.
individual units. In order to escape the budget 
maximization problems afflicting the current Forest Service,■
• • • • . G
it is crucial that units are only financed out of revenues 
and donations that they generate. Subsection .b provides fpr 
start-up funds for each of the National Forest Units,
Because the units would be decentralized, no money for an 
overriding management bureaucracy will be needed. For the 
-first year, this administrative allocation is redistributed 
to National Forest Units to alleviate the incentive to 
immediately sell high-value timber, such as old growth, to 
make the trust self-sustaining.
Section 5, subsection c lists how the receipts 
generated by the units are to be distributed amongst the 
beneficiary and the management of the unit. Another 
recipient, the biodiversity trust fund, also receives twenty 
percent of the gross receipts.
While the purpose of a biodiversity trust fund is explained 
in more detail below, by funding the biodiversity trust with • 
receipts from the trust at an equal level .as receipts paid 
to the states in supiport of public schools, biodiversity and 
ecological integrity are raised to a "quasi-beneficiary" 
level, providing greater protection for species.
The rest of section 5 is designed to eliminate many of
£>the economic disincentives that are currently found in the 
Forest Service.. Subsection e specifically eliminates the 
incentive of managers to maximize their budget by promoting
the uses of resources that curry favor with legislators that 
control their budgets. Instead, their budgets are tied to 
the actual productivity of the land they manage and the 
costs incurred in managing it., Subsection f rewards 
sustainable and efficient management. Instead of managers 
utilizing a "use it or lose it" budgetary framework, they 
can employ a more conservative approach and bank resources 
until they are actually needed. Subsection h liquidates ' 
funds, that have been held in trust and distributes them to 
the appropriate Unit. For example, under the Knutson- 
Vandenberg Act about 25% of timber receipts for fiscal years 
1992-1994 were retained^ for reforestation activities.185 
Elimination of these funds will further decentralize the 
units and break their dependence on Congressional 
appropriations.
Section 6 expressly provides for the use of 
conservation easements in order to preserve natural 
resources and biodiversity. The sale of conservation 
easements creates a market where "existence" value (the 
Value of just knowing the resource exists) and other non- 
market values can compete with market values. Any entity 
can purchase a conservation easement and the decision 
whether to sell a conservation easement must be given equal
I
weight.by the board of trustees as resource uses.
Subsection c mandates that, at the time that forest
185 See GAO, supra note 58, at 41.
boundaries are re-drawn, any existing wilderness areas will 
be protected by a conservation easement. As stated above, 
the original Thoreau model divided the management of 
wilderness and national forests.186 By including
s' 1 xwilderness within the management of a National Forest Unit, 
trustees can better incorporate ecosystem management since 
the boundaries of an ecosystem may include both wilderness 
and non-wilderness lands.
Section 7 establishes an independent biodiversity trust 
as a means for species preservation to actively compete with 
resource commodities. The biodiversity trust would be 
governed by a board of trustees drawn from scientists that 
represent areas of concern. Subsection b provides a 
considerable amount of flexibility for the Biodiversity 
Trust. If a linkage necessary for the protection of an 
endangered or threatened species is outside the boundaries 
of National Forest Unit, the linkage can be protected 
through the purchase of conservation units. In order to 
avoid administrative drain of trust resources, subsection c 
mandates that the vast majority of trust funds must be spent 
on the ground purchasing easements for species protection.
The National Forest Trust Act is not designed to 
eliminate all of the inefficiencies of Forest Service 
management. However, as a comparative model it is superior 
to the current regime that promotes economic inefficiencies
186 Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 44.-
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and ecological destruction. It is my/hope that the trust 
paradigm be debated and improved bn in order to provide 
some reform of the current system.
IV. Conclusion
The current problems with the Forest Service are well 
documented. Due to its roots in the Progressive Era, the 
Forest Service has not evolved into an agency capable of 
balancing the competing needs of public forest users; 
Instead, overcentralization has resulted in a top-down 
management approach that eater's to the most powerful 
interest groups*. This management. style will hinder the 
Forest Service's shift to.ecosystem management.
V * ,Furthermore, the agency budget structure and notions of 
community stability have created incentives to sell timber 
below' cost, resulting in both a net drain on the treasury 
and environmentally destructive logging.
These problems with the Forest Service have evolved for 
almost a century and are too ingrained to be addressed by 
any piecemeal reform. Instead, a large scale reform of the 
entire structure needs to initiated and a new paradigm for 
public forest management instituted. One possible paradigm 
could be a decentralized trust system governing national 
forest units that encompass individual watersheds.
Based on land management policies in the school trust 
lands context, a trust paradigm would.have many advantages
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for national forest management-. Trusts provide clear
mandates for the trustee, instead of confusing multiple use
mandates. Based on an established common law, trustees are
directly accountable to the beneficiary in perpetuity. Most
%
of the destructive economic incentives would be eliminated 
under a trust1 paradigm.. The competing duties of making the 
trust productive and preserving the corpus of the trust 
force trustees to balance short term economic needs and’long 
term preservation.
The "National Forest Trust Act", as proposed and 
modified in this paper can provide a worthwhile departure 
into examining how a trust paradigm for national forest 
management would be created. Trust language that mandates 
that lands be managed in accordance with accepted trust 
principles - and implementing ecosystem management will 
provide a clean break'with ingrained multiple use,, sustained' 
yield practices arid usher in a new era of national forest 
management•
However, the National Forest Trust Act also highlights 
some of the obstacles that must be surmounted before a trust 
paradigm can be adopted, namely the question of who is the 
beneficiary. Any meaningful.reform must not name a 1
I -
beneficiary class that is too large where clarity in trust 
mandates are lost and multiple use principles are embraced 
all over again. Furthermore, managing national forests "in 
trust for the people of the United States" will create a
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public trust regime that does- not have the accepted legal
theory as private trusts and may not apply to all of the
resources found in the national forests.
While the concept of a trust paradigm for national
forest management would require a complete revision of the
Forest Service as we now know it, it should be seriously
debated and analyzed for possible application. The
traditional opponents of trust management,.
environmentalists, should take a fresh look at the
possibilities that a trust may present for environmental
protection. However, as with any reform, compromise is
necessary for any meaningful change. All national forest »
users are ,going to have to give up some of the benefits they 
■now enjoy, whether that means losing free recreation, 
subsidized.resource extraction,' or national control. Until 
users are willing to do that, any reform is unlikely.
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APPEND.IX I: National Forest Trust Act ■
A Bill
To improve economic efficiency and environmental quality of 
the Nation's renewable forest and rangeland resources 
management.'
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of 
Representatives of the United States of -America in 
Congress Assembled,
Section 1. SHORT TITLE
\This Act may be cited as the."National Forest Trust
Act. "
Section 2. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the Nation's 
renewable forest and rangeland resources be managed by the 
Forest Service so as to ,provide for the greatest economic 
efficiency, environmental quality, and responsiveness to 
public demand for resources.
Section 3. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Act-
(a) the term "National Forest System" means the 
national forests, national grasslands, and other lands 
managed by the U.S.D.A. Forest Service;
(b) the- term "proclaimed national forest" means the 
current Congressional designations of national forest or 
national grasslands and their boundaries;
(c) the term "National Forest Unit" means one of a
number of management units of the National Forest System as 
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture under section 4„ 
paragraph a of this Act;
(d) the term "National Forest Trust" means a chartered 
organization, with a membership and a board of trustees 
elected by the membership, that is authorized and obligated 
to manage a National Forest Unit in trust for the support of 
public schools in the United States.
(e) the term "secretary" means the secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture.
Section 4. NATIONAL FOREST TRUSTS.
(a) Within four months of the- passage of this Act, the 
Secretary of Agriculture shall draft a division of all 
lands, including wildernesses and wild and scenic rivers, in 
the National Forest System into individual National Forest 
Units,, establishing clear boundaries for each unit. Such 
boundaries shall closely approximate the recognized 
boundaries of individual watersheds. In order to more 
closely approximate the geography of individual watersheds, 
the boundaries may be drawn with no regard for current' 
political boundaries. Final determination of. National• 
Forest Unit boundaries shall be made after 3 0 days of public 
comment but no later than six months after passage of this 
Act.
(b). The Secretary shall appoint an interim supervisor 
.for each National Forest Unit. The interim supervisor shall
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carry out the laws and regulations of the Forest Service 
until the first meeting of the Board of Trustees of the ' 
National Forest Unit.
(c) Upon establishment of the National Forest Unit 
boundaries, the Secretary shall create for each unit a 
National Forest Trust, which shall be a. not-for-profit 
corporation chartered under the laws of the United States. 
Any citizen of the United States can become a member of any 
National Forest Trust for a nominal annual fee, initially 
set at $20 per year, paid to the supervisor or interim, 
supervisor of the National Forest Unit. Each trust shall 
have complete management jurisdiction over the lands and 
resources subject with the associated National Forest Unit, 
subject to the provisions of section 4, paragraphs e, f, g,, 
and h,' of this Act.
(d) Within 90 days of the establishment of each 
national Forest Trust, the interim supervisor of each' 
National Forest Unit shall arrange for members to elect, by- 
mail-in ballot, a nine-member Board of Trustees. Board 
members shall have three-year terms, with three members 
elected each year.
. (e) The Board of Trustees for each National Forest 
Trust shall be obligated to manage the associated National 
Forest Uni't in trust for the public schools in the United 
States. Such management shall be in accordance with 
established duties of the trustee, balancing the duty to
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make the trust productive, and the duty to preserve the 
corpus of the trust as a prudent investor would. Every 
attempt' at implementing management at’ an ecosystem scale 
will be undertaken by the Board. Such management shall also 
be subject to those federal laws that would apply to any 
private land trust or land owner.
(f) The Board of Trustees of each National Forest Unit:- 
shall have the following powers:
(1) The power to select from among themselves a 
chair and other officers as deemed appropriate;
(2) The power to hire and fire the supervisor,of 
t.he National Forest Unit;
(3) The power to approve an annual operating plan, 
including the establishment of budgets, fees, 
activities and projects, the allocations of land to 
various uses, and criteria and procedures used to sell 
or lease’resources within the jurisdiction of the 
National Forest Trust;
(4) The power to set membership fees arid arrange 
annual, mail-in elections for members of the Board.
(g) Notwithstanding the provisidris of any other law, . 
each National Forest Unit may charge fees at fair market 
value for any of the resources within their jurisdiction
s
subject to the requirements of section 4, paragraph e of 
this Act.
(h) The Board of Trustees shall not sell any of the
lands within their jurisdictions. However, • they may- 
exchange land for land of equal value if such an exchange 
will ease the management of lands in their jurisdiction and 
such exchanges meet the objectives specified in section 4, 
paragraph e of this Act. The Board of Trustees may also - 
acquire more land from public or pi^Lvate sources and if such 
acquisitions meet the objectives specified in section 5, 
paragraph e of this Act.
(i) Board members shall receive- no compensation for 
their time, but may elect'to reimburse themselves for costs 
traveling to and from and participating in board meetings.
(j) A court, with the appropriate subject matter 
jurisdiction, may revoke the charter of any Wilderness Trust 
in the event of gross malfeasance or violation of any 
provision of section 4 of this Act.
(k) In the event that any National Forest Unit is 
unable to sustain itself with the funds provided for it
under section 6 of this Act, the Board of Trustees for that
. '  • (
unit may elect to transfer the lands under its jurisdiction 
to the jurisdiction of any other willing National Forest 
Trust.
Section 5. BUDGET AND FINANCE
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, 
no funds-may be appropriated to the National-Forest Units or 
National Forest Trusts except as described in this section.
(b) During the first fiscal year beginning after
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passage of this Act, Congress may appropriate funds to.each 
National Forest Unit equal to the funds appropriated for the 
management of the lands within such National Forest Unit 
during the previous fiscal year,.exclusive of funds spent by 
the Regional, Washington, or other non-ranger district or 
non-national forest supervisor offices of the Forest 
Service. Those funds spent by the Regional, Washington, or 
other non-ranger districts or non-national forest supervisor 
offices of the Forest Service will be reallpcated to the 
National Forest Units based on need for that fiscal year.
(c) At the end of. each fiscal year beginning with the 
first fiscal year after passage of this Act, the Secretary 
of Agriculture shall audit each National Forest Unit to 
determine the total funds expended and the total receipts 
collected by each unit during that fiscal year. Receipts 
collected by each unit shall be divided as follows:-
(1) 100 percent of the net receipts shall be 
retained by the National Forest Trust to be spent 
managing and improving the lands and resources under 
the trusts jurisdiction;
(2) 20 percent of the gross receipts shall be paid 
to the states for the support of public schools;
(3) All remaining receipts, up to a maximum of 2 0 
percent of the gross.receipts, shall be paid to the 
National Biodiversity Trust Fund;
(4) All remaining receipts shall be deposited into
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the general fund of the'United States treasury.
i
(d) National Forest Trusts may retain 100 percent of 
any donations paid to the trusts- to spend on managing and 
improving the lands and resources under the trust's 
jurisdiction, provided that such donations shall, not be made 
in exchange for any goods or services provided by the 
National Forest unit in the trust's jurisdiction. Donations 
made in exchange for goods or services shall be considered 
user fees and shall be distributed as provided in section 5, 
paragraph c of this Act.
(e) The distributions of funds described in section 5, 
paragraphs c and d of this Act shall not be a part of the 
budget of the United States and shall not require annual 
approval or appropriation by the United States Congress.
(f) Funds appropriated to the National Forest Units and 
Wilderness Systems under section 5, paragraph b, and funds 
retained by the National Forest Units under section 5, 
paragraph c, and d of this Act that are not spent in any 
given fiscal year'may be carried over by such National 
Forest or Wilderness System to be spent in any future fiscal 
year.
(h) Trust funds held by the Treasury in account for the 
Forest Service under the Act of August 11, 1916, the 
Knutsen-Vandenberg Act of 1930, the National Forest Roads 
and Trails Act of 1964, and the National Forest Management 
Act of 1976 as of the first day of the first fiscal year
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after passage of this Act
shall be made available to the National Forest Units that 
generated those funds so that they may be used for the
purposes for which they were intended according to
\
established plans approved by the Supervisors.
Section 6. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
(a) Supervisors are authorized to sell resource rights 
in the form of conservation easements on National Forest 
System lands. Conservation easements may convey rights to 
timber harvesting, grazing, mineral development and/or other 
uses. Conservation easements may exist for a limited time 
or in perpetuity. The price of a conservation easement must 
equal or exceed the price of commodity uses foregone, 
adjusted for the difference in costs of administering the 
easement instead of the commodity use; in the case of 
renewable resources, the price should also be adjusted for 
the future value of the renewed'resource commodities.
(b) Any agency of the Federal Executive, the States and. 
any. political or governmental subdivision thereof, any 
corporation, not-for-profit corporation, private entity or 
person may hold a conservation easement on national forest 
land. ■ In a transaction involving a contract for use of 
forest or rangeland resources, any bids for a conservation 
easement on the area must be accorded equal weight with bids 
for traditional resource uses; the highest bid shall be 
accepted taking into account the true cost of a conservation
easement when adjusted according to the factors detailed in 
the previous paragraph.
(c) At the time that National Forest Unit boundaries 
are established in accordance with section 4, paragraph a, 
all existing wilderness areas and wild and scenic rivers 
found within-proclaimed national forests are placed within a 
conservation easement, the term of which are consistent with 
the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the Wild and Scenic'Rivers 
Act of 1968, in perpetuity.
Section 7. NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY TRUST
(a) The director of the Smithsonian Institute shall 
create a National Biodiversity Trust dedicated to protecting 
a repository of diverse ecosystems and habitat for 
threatened and endangered species of wildlife.
(b) The National Biodiversity Trust is to be governed 
by a Biodiversity Board of Trustees who shall' administer 
funds in the National Biodiversity Trust Fund by purchasing 
conservation easements or paying landowners or land managers 
for providing habitat for threatened and endangered species 
of wildlife. The Biodiversity Board of Trustees shall ‘ 
consist'of seven members selected by the director of the 
Smithsonian Institute each of whom is qualified in 
anthropology, biology, zoology, botany, ecology, or other 
life and social sciences. *
(c) No more than 1 percent of the National Biodiversity 
Trust Fund may be used for administrative purposes. No more
than 20 percent of the National Biodiversity Trust Fund may 
be used for research and inventory purposes. The remainder 
of the fund must be dedicated to the protection of. 
biodiversity, including but not limited to:
(1) The purchase of conservation easements on 
public or private.land;
(2) Payments to public land managers or private 
landowners who provide habitat for threatened and 
endangered species of wildlife;
(3) Grants to, federal, state or local agencies, or 
to corporations or individuals, in support of projects 
aimed at protecting or improving biodiversity.
